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I. Introduction and Summary
There were a number of important developments in the U.S. export control and economic
sanctions laws in 1996. However, what may be most remarkable about the year was the degree
to which U.S. policymakers failed to focus on reorienting U.S. law away from the defunct
priorities of the Cold War era, which still govern the overall structure of U.S. export controls.
The most noteworthy events were the initiatives of U.S. policymakers in the economic sanctions
area, including the controversial unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions measures enacted against
Cuba, Iran, and Libya. These measures triggered the greatest level of conflict between the
United States and its foreign allies over U.S. sanctions policy since the Soviet gas pipeline
episode of the early 1980s. In many ways, the new sanctions were a throwback to a bygone
era and represented a retreat from multilateralist principles that had, until then, been ascendant
in U.S. export control and sanctions policy.
In 1996, Congress and the executive branch again, for the sixth year running, failed to agree
on a common vision for revision and reauthorization of the Export Administration Act (EAA).
It was evident early in the year that export control reform was a low priority both for Congress
and the president in an election year. Consequently, many interested U.S. private sector groups,
frustrated by the failures of concerted efforts in the past, simply focused their resources on
other issues. In the end, the old EAA was extended yet again by executive order.
In the absence of statutory reform, the Commerce Department completed a substantial
reorganization of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that implement the established
EAA. While this may simplify compliance with export licensing requirements for exporters to
some extent, the action did not alter the fundamental structure or underlying principles of the
law, which remain rooted in the expired statute. Indeed, the basic orientation of the EAR still
reflects antedated Cold War era strategic concerns. Consequently, interagency initiatives in 1996
to liberalize export controls on high-technology products with civilian commercial applications,
including computer, encryption, and satellite products, are expected to have limited practical
effect. On a more hopeful note, the Wassenaar "New Forum" group finally came into being
in 1996 as the successor to the former CoCom regime. However, the mission of this multilateral
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entity, and the specific changes it will bring to the U.S. export control laws, remained undear
at year's end.
In the end, 1996 may best be remembered as a year in which U.S. policymakers continued
to be divided on questions associated with the challenge of reconciling evolving U.S. trade
interests with the new strategic concerns of the post-Cold War era. As the failure in 1996 of
the United States to ratify the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention suggests, rather
than try to come to terms with these issues, U.S. elected officials apparently focused on advancing
short-term domestic political objectives and a domestic electoral agenda.
II. U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions Initiatives
Perhaps the most remarkable developments of 1 996 were the statutory expansion of the
U.S. sanctions regimes against Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Efforts by the 104th Congress to enact
legislation to toughen the U.S. sanctions already in place against these countries did not come
as a surprise. Congress has long taken a much more aggressive approach to sanctions issues
than the executive branch of the U.S. Government. In the past, however, the executive branch
has tempered such congressional initiatives and asserted itself on these issues under the president's
constitutional prerogative with regard to national security and foreign policy issues.
Other sanctions initiatives in Congress in 1996 were diluted by executive branch intervention.
One of these was an initiative that led to enactment in the fall of new sanctions against Burma
(Myanmar), establishing a discretionary mandate for the president to take punitive action against
the military regime in Rangoon for suppressing democratic reform and committing human
rights abuses.' A similar but unsuccessful congressional sanctions effort in 1996 was directed
against Nigeria based on similar human rights and democracy concerns.
What was somewhat unexpected in 1996 was that the president of the United States would
approve new sanctions laws with extraterritorial enforcement provisions dearly bound to aggra-
vate tensions with important U.S. allies. Moreover, it was equally surprising that the president
would enact laws that could significantly limit executive branch authority in this area of policy.
However, that is exactly what President Clinton did when he signed into law the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act3 and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 4
A. CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMocRATIc SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) AcT
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (commonly known as the
Helms-Burton law) was signed into law by President Clinton on March 1, 1996, in direct
response to the downing of U.S. civilian aircraft by Cuban fighter aircraft over the Florida
Straits late in February. Although the law was specifically intended to put further pressure on
the Cuban Government to permit a transition to democracy, it was more the product of U.S.
electoral politics than balanced strategic planning. Simply stated, in late February 1996, President
Clinton and his political advisors were preoccupied with the president's campaign for reelection.
Florida, and to a lesser extent New Jersey, were considered critical to that effort, and the
1. These sanctions provisions were enacted as an amendment to the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for 1997
in Tide V section 101(c) of the final bill. Omnibus Appropriations Bill for 1997, Tide V § 101(c), Pub. L,
No. 104-208, 104th Cong. (1996).
2. See Nigeria Democracy Act, S. 1419 and H.R. 2697, 104th Cong. (1996).
3. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 104th Cong. (1996).
4. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), Pub. L. No. 104-172, 104th Cong. (1996).
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Cuban-American communities in each of these states were viewed as important constituencies
whose concerns needed to be addressed. Although the Clinton administration previously had
strongly opposed the core provisions of the Helms-Burton initiative, it quickly reversed its
position following the incident in the Florida Straits. Now that the bill is law, it presents the
executive branch with significant challenges that have broader ramifications for U.S. economic
sanctions policy.
1. Private Right of Aaion
Perhaps the most controversial provisions of the Helms-Burton law are the Title III provisions
establishing a private right of action for U.S. citizens against persons who traffic in property
allegedly expropriated by the Cuban Government.$ Under the law's broad definition of traffick-
ing, foreign companies with Cuban holdings, and companies that do business with Cuban entities,
face the possibility of being sued in the U.S. federal courts by naturalized Cuban-Americans and
other U.S. nationals with claims against Cuba." In some cases, the law provides for the award
of treble damages.7 Moreover, the law expressly disallows use of the Act of State doctrine as
a defense in such actions.! The Title III provisions, in particular, have been the focus of hostile
responses-induding the enactment of foreign blocking statutes and initiation of challenges in
the World Trade Organization and under the North American Free Trade Agreement-by
some of the United States' closest allies.
2. Suspension of Private Right of Action
Significantly, the new law gives the president authority to suspend the Tide III private right
of action provisions for six-month intervals.9 President Clinton has already exercised this option
on two occasions-in August 1996 and January 1997. In announcing the second such decision,
the president indicated that he intended to extend these suspensions on an ongoing basis as
long as U.S. allies continue to pressure Cuba to adopt reforms.
While President Clinton's actions were dearly intended to diminish the concerns of U.S.
allies, they also prompted bitter criticism from some congressional champions of the new law
and threats of possible future action in 1997 to force the administration to take stronger action
under the law. As the events of February and March 1996 illustrate, unforeseen incidents
involving Cuba could easily precipitate a crisis leading to a change in the president's position
on the issue. Thus, considerable uncertainty continues to be associated with Tide III of the
Helms-Burton law, notwithstanding suspension of the private right of action provisions.
3. Visa Restrictions
Another controversial aspect of the Helms-Burton law is the provision, under Tide IV, for
the denial of visas to and exclusion from the United States of foreign persons, including foreign
executives or their agents (and members of their families), if they are associated with trafficking
in property allegedly expropriated by Cuba.' ° Such persons also may be subject to prosecution
5. LIBERTAD Act, Title III § 306(a). The private right of action provisions were initially scheduled to
take effect August 1, 1996. However, as indicated below, the provisions were suspended for the balance of 1996
by President Clinton under discretionary authority granted to him under the law.
6. See LIBERTAD Act, Section 4(13).
7. Id. Tide III § 302(aX3).
8. Id. § 302(a).
9. Id. § 306.
10. Id.
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by the U.S. Government and/or private U.S. citizens based on their corporate affidiation."
However, in 1996 the U.S. Department of State, which administers these provisions, took
only limited action against the executives of several foreign companies."
4. Compromise of Executive Brancb Discretion
Finally, another important aspect of the Helms-Burton is its unprecedented codification of
the U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba. Previously, the sanctions were principally authorized
and implemented by a series of executive orders."3 Tide I of the new law gives force to these
provisions as a matter of statutory law, however. Thus, the sanctions can only be scaled back
or lifted henceforward by a formal act of Congress.
Accordingly, this provision significantly curtails the president's authority over the Cuban
sanctions regime. As a practical matter, the president will now be forced to seek the approval
of Congress in order to alter U.S. policy toward Cuba. ' 4 President Clinton's enactment of the
law thus could be interpreted as a surrender of significant executive branch powers over national
security and foreign policy concems in the sanctions area. However, it can be expected that
the administration would take a different view of this issue. Therefore, these provisions in
particular provide a potential basis for further conflict between the president and Congress on
sanctions issues.
B. IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS Acr OF 1996
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) expands the preexisting U.S. embargoes
against Iran and Libya by establishing a controversial secondary U.S. boycott against foreign
companies otherwise exempt from U.S. jurisdiction for engaging in certain types of oil and
gas sector investments in either country.'" Although the preexisting U.S. sanctions already
imposed extraterritorial restrictions on exports of U.S. goods to either country, the secondary
boycott provisions of the new law have seriously antagonized U.S. allies worldwide.'6 Although
the Clinton administration previously repudiated the secondary boycott provisions, the president
reversed that position by signing the new law on August 5, 1996, apparently in response to
pressures associated with the presidential election campaign and speculation that the explosion
of TWA Flight 800 over Long Island was linked with international terrorism.
1. Iran
With regard to Iran, ILSA mandates imposition of U.S. sanctions against foreign companies
that invest $40 million or more in one year in the Iranian petroleum sector. 7 However, the
II. See id. § 302(a)(1).
12. In July, the State Department initiated such action against executives associated with a handful of compa-
nies, including companies based in Canada, Mexico, and Italy.
13. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 515 (1996).
14. Among other things, the law also mandates that the United States terminate foreign aid to Russia and
other independent states of the former Soviet Union that provide assistance to or engage in nonmarket-based
trade with Cuba. See LIBERTAD Act, Title I § 106(c).
15. The Iranian Transactions Regulations are codified at 31 C.F.R. Pt. 560 (1996). The Libyan Sanctions
Regulations are codified at 31 C.F.R. Pt. 550 (1996).
16. Given the longstandingopposition ofthe United States to secondary boycotts imposed by other countries-
especially the Arab boycott against Israel-it is particularly ironic that the Clinton administration would enact a
law with such provisions.
17. ILSA § 5(a).
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threshold may be lowered to $20 million for foreign companies that refuse to cooperate with
U.S. efforts to isolate Iran. 8
2. Libya
ILSA's sanctions against Libya are somewhat broader, consistent with the preexisting trade
restrictions established by the multilateral U.N. embargo. ILSA calls for mandatory imposition
of U.S. sanctions against any foreign company that violates the U.N. ban on exports to Libya
of oil and gas sector equipment, goods or services that might facilitate Libyan acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction, or goods or services associated with the Libyan aviation sector."
Like the measures against Iran, ILSA imposes mandatory sanctions against foreign companies
that make investments of more than $40 million a year in Libya's petroleum sector." However,
unlike the provisions for Iran, this threshold may not be reduced."
3. ILSA Sanctions
ILSA requires the president to impose at least two of six possible sanctions, for a period of
two or more years, against foreign companies that violate the investment and trade restrictions
against either Iran or Libya.22 Potential sanctions include: (1) a ban on Export-Import Bank
funding for exports to the entity concerned; (2) denial of U.S. export licenses for exports or
reexports of U.S. products to the sanctioned entity; (3) a ban on loans exceeding $10 million
by U.S. financial institutions in any 12-month period to a sanctioned entity; (4) prohibition
of participation by a sanctioned entity in U.S. Government contracts; (5) a ban on imports
of goods or services to the United States that are traceable to a sanctioned entity; and (6) a
prohibition against the use of a sanctioned foreign financial institution as a repository for U.S.
Government funds or as a primary dealer in U.S. Government debt instruments."
4. Implementation and Enforcement
In 1996, the Clinton administration took a reluctant approach to implementation and enforce-
ment of ILSA. Despite several high-profile oil and gas sector deals with Iran involving Turkey,
Malaysia, and other countries, and calls for action by members of Congress, the administration
refrained from taking any enforcement action under ILSA in 1996. Although State Department
officials suggested that they would clarify their interpretation of ILSA's mandate and how they
intended to apply the law in the fall, in the end the administration gave litde indication of
how it will proceed. Guidance with regard to these issues published by the State Department
in December 1996 left open questions concerning what circumstances might lead to related
enforcement actions by the United States.24 Thus, the administration preserved as much as
possible its ability to exercise discretion under the law.
18. Id. § 4(d).
19. Id. § 5(b)(1).
20. Id. § 5(b)(2).
21. See ILSA § 4(d) and ILSA § 5.
22. ILSA §§ 5(a), 5(b), and 9(b). ILSA sanctions apply only to "new" investments entered into after August
5, 1996, the effective date of the law. Investments initiated prior to that date are specifically exempt from the
secondary boycott provisions. ILSA §§ 5(a), 5(bX2). Notwithstanding guidance issued in December 1996, it
remains unclear what types of investments may be treated as actionable by the State Department under ILSA.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (December 16, 1996).
23. ILSA §§ 6(l)-6(6).
24. 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (December 16, 1996).
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C. ADMINISTRATION APPROACH TO THE NEW SANCTIONS LAWS
The Clinton Administration's actions in 1996 with respect to the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act and the Helms-Burton law against Cuba, particularly following the U.S. election in Novem-
ber, were apparently intended to reassure U.S. allies that the United States would take a
restrained approach to the new sanctions laws. However, the administration's actions sparked
significant criticism by members of Congress, and threats of possible new unilateral sanctions
initiatives in 1997. Therefore, at the close of 1996, it appeared that the successful unilateral
sanctions initiatives of the 104th Congress against Cuba, Iran, and Libya might foreshadow
a return to a trend in U.S. sanctions practice that lost favor following the Soviet gas pipeline
sanctions episode of the early 1980s. At the same time, a variety of private sector initiatives
opposing such measures took shape in response. Consequently, a significant debate on sanctions
issues was joined by year's end.
III. Developments in the U.S. Export Control Laws
Perhaps most significant in 1996, for yet another year, Congress and the Executive Branch
were unable to agree on how to revise the Export Administration Act.2" Since 1990, when
the EAA lapsed in the twilight of the Cold War, the statute has simply been extended from
year to year by a series of executive orders. President Clinton continued that tradition in 1996,
notwithstanding questions concerning the legal basis for these extensions of the export control
law.26 Despite a substantial reorganization of the Export Administration Regulations that imple-
ment the EAA, the fundamental structure and orientation of the export control regime remained
essentially intact as the year came to a close. By the end of the year, it was evident that
the officials charged with administration of the U.S. export controls were focused more on
enforcement of established trade restrictions than reform of these laws. Thus, despite significant
cosmetic changes, the underpinnings of U.S. export controls remained largely unchanged in
1996.
A. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
Although the reorganized Export Administration Regulations published by the Department
of Commerce in March 1996 caused some initial consternation to veteran export control
practitioners, in most respects, the new regulations carry forward the substantive policies of
the existing law. 7 While the new regulations reflect a change in the basic terminology associated
with licensing requirements and exceptions, most newly decontrolled categories of goods and
technology were previously eligible for unrestricted export under general license.
As a practical matter, and notwithstanding such superficial changes, the essential requirements
governing submission and review of formal applications, when necessary to obtain written
2Y. Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420.
26. Exec. Order no. 12924, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,527 (August IS, 1996).
27. The new EAR were published in the Federal Register on March 25, 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714
(March 25, 1996). The regulations are codified at 15 C.F.R. Pts. 730-774 (1996). The new EAR also reflect
another noteworthy, if belated, development in January 1996, when the Commerce Department published
regulations to lower the thresholds for EAR export restrictions and controls for computer technology. See
61 Fed. Reg. 2099 (January 25, 1996), codified at 1S C.F.R. Pts. 770-776, 785-787, 799 (1996). However,
this relaxation of export restrictions lagged far behind technical developments in the computer industry and
was the first such liberalization of these EAR controls since 1993.
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authorization for exports from the Commerce Department, were not significantly changed.
Although the new EAR simplify and reduce administrative paperwork requirements, with only
limited exceptions, they do not implement significant changes in restrictive licensing policies.2"
From an exporter's perspective, the new regulations may be viewed as an improvement to
the extent that they consolidate, and therefore clarify, many of the special foreign policy and
national security based trade restrictions governing specific countries and categories of products.
For example, the new EAR include a consolidated chart that summarizes licensing requirements
for specific countries and reflects some slight changes in country groupings consistent with
prior changes of corresponding U.S. export control policy.' 9 Thus, it may be somewhat easier
for companies to determine what licensing requirements apply to a specific proposed export.
Despite such simplification of the old export control regulations, however, the new EAR still
may be daunting to the uninitiated and continue to impose significant impediments to U.S.
exports.
Implementation of the new regulations presented veteran exporters with the tedious task
of relearning the established regulatory framework. The new EAR harmonizes the ECCN
commodity classification headings included in the Commerce Control List with the correspond-
ing classification systems of the European Union and other countries. The change required
U.S. exporters to undertake a global review and redassification of their products. In a few
instances, the new classifications resulted in more restrictive licensing policies for some items
than previously applied." Exporters were required to conform with the new regulations by
January 1997, following a grace-period for conversion that was extended through the end of
1996.
B. COMMODITY JURISDICTION TRANSFERS
In 1996, following great controversy and effort by U.S. officials and private sector interests
alike, the Clinton administration approved some significant commodity jurisdiction transfers
for certain dual-use items previously controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)3"
and corresponding International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).3" In particular, the deci-
sions affecting commercial communications satellites and hot-section technology and encryption
products were hailed by U.S. officials as an important liberalization of U.S. export restrictions.
However, these actions may have little practical effect.
1. Satellite and Hot-Section Technology
After a prolonged review, the determination transferring commodity jurisdiction for commer-
cial communications satellites and hot-section technology from the State Department to the
Department of Commerce was issued in October 1996.3 At the same time, however, special
28. The new EAR also include changes intended to streamline procedures for the review of export license
applications under a new and shorter 90-day deadline established by executive order in December 1995. Exec.
Order No. 12981 (December 5, 1995), 61 Fed. Reg. 62,981 (December 8, 1995).
29. 15 C.F.R. Pt. 738, Supp. no. 1 (1996).
30. See, e.g., J. Black, Details, Details, Details-Converting to the New Regs, THE EXPORT P[AcrrrIoNER (July
1996).
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (as amended).
32. 22 C.F.R. Pt. 120, a seq. (1996).
33. 64 Fed. Reg. 54,540 (October 21, 1996).
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foreign policy and national security restrictions that dosely parallel similar restrictions previously
applied by the State Department under the ITAR were also imposed on affected items. 4
The commodity jurisdiction transfer for commercial communications satellites and hot-section
technology had long been advocated by U.S. aerospace manufacturers. Accordingly, these
companies publidy hailed the administration's decision. However, many industry representatives
privately have expressed significant reservations about the new restrictions applied in review
of related licensing issues under the new EAR.
As a general matter, the transfer mandates Commerce Department licensing for such exports
to any destination other than Canada, as was the case under ITAR control. Related Commerce
determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis. The same agencies that previously were
involved in State Department licensing decisions under the ITAR are also to have a role in
determinations made under the EAR. However, unlike licensing procedures for other categories
of products under the EAR, an interagency committee, rather than the Commerce Department
itself, will have the final say in related licensing decisions. Thus, apart from the use of Commerce
Department rather than State Department forms, it is unclear whether the transfer will result
in any practical difference in the decision-making process, or provide any advantage to U.S.
exporters.
2. Encryption
In October 1996, the White House also announced its decision to liberalize restrictions on
exports of encryption technology by transferring commodity jurisdiction for certain encryption
items from the State Department to the Department of Commerce." Effective January 1, 1997,
the action raised the export licensing threshold for control of encryption algorithms from a
40-bit to a 56-bit key length. However, the transfer places some significant burdens on U.S.
exporters.
Under the determination, U.S. manufacturers seeking export licenses from the Commerce
Department for such encryption products are required to develop a key recovery system within
two years as a condition for licensing approval.3 6 Moreover, the new interagency process
established for Commerce Department review of related licensing questions, like that established
for commercial communications satellites and hot-section technology, will involve the same
agencies formerly involved in State Department review for such products, but with the addition
of FBI involvement. Consequently, many in the private sector have been left wondering to
what extent the "liberalization" of these controls will result in meaningful advantages for
would-be exporters, and whether the new procedures will simply complicate the licensing
process for items previously eligible for State Department licensing.
IV. Conclusions
The apparent focus of U.S. private sector groups in 1996 on efforts to combat the new
trend of unilateralism in U.S. economic sanctions policy in some ways may be seen as a position
34. It should be noted that the transfer did not affect products classified as space launch vehicles. These
remain subject to ITAR control. Production and manufacturing data, and related services and technical assistance,
for satellites and other types of spacecraft also remain subject to State Department control under the ITAR.
35. The decision was implemented by executive order in November 1996. Exec. Order No. 13,026
(November 19, 1996).
36. See 61 Fed. Reg. 6,852 (December 30, 1996).
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of retreat from efforts in previous years that concentrated on promoting a restructuring of the
U.S. export control laws through revision of the Export Administration Act. Many of the
same U.S. industry groups engaged in efforts to oppose the upsurge of unilateral U.S. sanctions
in 1996 were at the forefront of previous initiatives to secure meaningful reform of the U.S.
export controls. They recognized that 1996 was not so much a year of reform as it was a year
in which U.S. lawmakers, preoccupied with domestic political priorities in an election year,
retreated to the old artifices of a bygone era in U.S. export policy. Thus, by the end of the
year, the issue of U.S. unilateral sanctions had taken center stage in the public debate on U.S.
export control and economic sanctions policy.
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